Search Results

If you are not able to attend WCX 2022 in-person, you will have the opportunity to join a selected number of live technical and executive discussions online that will advance your skill set in propulsion, connectivity security and safety as well as the business of technology.

SAE EDGE Research Reports provide examinations significant topics facing mobility industry today including Connected Automated Vehicle Technologies Electrification Advanced Manufacturing

SAE EDGE Research Reports provide examinations significant topics facing mobility industry today including Connected Automated Vehicle Technologies Electrification Advanced Manufacturing

This document addresses the development of security material for application specifications in SAE V2X Technical Committees. The assumption in this document is that two groups with distinct missions contribute to the development of each standard: the “Application Specification Team is in charge of specifying the application functionality and the “Security Specification Team” is in charge of specifying the security. The two teams may, of course, have a significant overlap of members.

This standard sets forth the desired characteristics of a second-generation aviation Ku-band and Ka-band satellite communication (satcom) system intended for installation in all types of aircraft.

The purpose of this document is to provide recommended guidance and provisions for ACARS Message Security (AMS) key management. The key management framework described herein is based on open international standards that are adapted to the ACARS datalink communications environment.

Controller area network (CAN) is used as a legacy protocol for in-vehicle communication. However, it lacks basic security features such as message authentication, integrity, confidentiality, etc., because the sender information in the message is missing. Hence, it is prone to different attacks like spoofing attacks, denial of service attacks, man in the middle and masquerade attacks. Researchers have proposed various techniques to detect and prevent these attacks, which can be split into two classes: (a) MAC-based techniques and (b) intrusion detection-based techniques. Further, intrusion detection systems can be divided into four categories: (i) message parameter- based, (ii) entropy-based, (iii) machine Learning-based and (iv) fingerprinting-based. This paper details state-of- the-art survey of fingerprinting-based intrusion detection techniques. In addition, the advantages and limitations of different fingerprinting-based intrusion detection techniques methods will be discussed.

The scope of this SAE Recommended Practice is to require the use of the same Security Services as defined by the International Standard ISO/CD 15764, modified by the Class of Security as determined by the resource provider and referenced in Table 1, Extended Data Link Security References.

SAE is developing a number of standards, including the SAE J2945/x and SAE J3161/x series, that specify a set of applications using message sets from the SAE J2735 data dictionary. (“Application” is used here to mean “a collection of activities including interactions between different entities in the service of a collection of related goals and associated with a given IEEE Provider Service Identifier (PSID)”). Authenticity and integrity of the communications for these applications are ensured using digital signatures and IEEE 1609.2 digital certificates, which also indicate the permissions of the senders using Provider Service Identifiers (PSIDs) and Service Specific Permissions (SSPs). The PSID is a globally unique identifier associated with an application specification that unambiguously describes how to build interoperable instances of that application.

This document defines a standard implementation for strong client authentication and encryption of Wi-Fi-based client connections to onboard Wireless LAN (WLAN) networks. WLAN networks may consist of multi-purpose inflight entertainment system networks operating in the Passenger Information and Entertainment System (PIES) domain, dedicated aircraft cabin wireless networks or localized Aircraft Integrated Data (AID) devices operating in the Aircraft Information Services (AIS) domain. The purpose of this document is to focus on the client devices requiring connections to these networks such as electronic flight bags, flight attendant mobile devices, onboard Internet of Things (IoT) devices, AID devices (acting as clients) and mobile maintenance devices. Passenger devices are not within the focus of this document.

Driven by the growing internet and remote connectivity of automobiles, combined with the emerging trend to automated driving, the importance of security for automotive systems is massively increasing. Although cyber security is a common part of daily routines in the traditional IT domain, necessary security mechanisms are not yet widely applied in the vehicles. At first glance, this may not appear to be a problem as there are lots of solutions from other domains, which potentially could be re-used. But substantial differences compared to an automotive environment have to be taken into account, drastically reducing the possibilities for simple reuse. Our contribution is to address automotive electronics engineers who are confronted with security requirements. Therefore, it will firstly provide some basic knowledge about IT security and subsequently present a selection of automotive specific security use cases.

This SAE Recommended Practice establishes a uniform practice for protecting vehicle components from "unauthorized" access through a vehicle data link connector (DLC). The document defines a security system for motor vehicle and tool manufacturers. It will provide flexibility to tailor systems to the security needs of the vehicle manufacturer. The vehicle modules addressed are those that are capable of having solid state memory contents accessed or altered through the data link connector. Improper memory content alteration could potentially damage the electronics or other vehicle modules; risk the vehicle compliance to government legislated requirements; or risk the vehicle manufacturer's security interests. This document does not imply that other security measures are not required nor possible.

Abstract Cyberattacks on financial and government institutions, critical infrastructure, voting systems, businesses, modern vehicles, and so on are on the rise. Fully connected autonomous vehicles are more vulnerable than ever to hacking and data theft. This is due to the fact that the industry still relies on controller area network (CAN) protocol for in-vehicle control networks. The CAN protocol lacks basic security features such as message authentication, which makes it vulnerable to a wide range of attacks including spoofing attacks. This article presents a novel method to protect CAN protocol against packet spoofing, replay, and denial of service (DoS) attacks. The proposed method exploits physical uncolonable attributes in the physical channel between transmitting and destination nodes and uses them for linking the received packet to the source.

This course provides an overview of state-of-the-art intelligent vehicles, presents a systematic framework for intelligent technologies and vehicle-level architecture, and introduces testing methodologies to evaluate individual and integrated intelligent functions. Considering the increasing demand for vehicle intelligence, it is critical to gain an understanding of the growing variety of intelligent vehicle technologies and how they must function together effectively as a system.

Abstract Connected vehicle technology consisting of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication falls under the umbrella of V2X, or Vehicle-to-Everything, communication. This enables vehicles and infrastructure to exchange safety-related information to enable smarter, safer roads. If driver alerts are raised or automated action is taken as a result of these messages, it is critical that messages are trustworthy and reliable. To this end, the Security Credential Management System (SCMS) and Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems (C-ITS) Credential Management System (CCMS) have been proposed to enable authentication and authorization of V2X messages without compromising individual user privacy. This is accomplished by issuing each vehicle a large set of “pseudonyms,” unrelated to any real-world identity. During operation, the vehicle periodically switches pseudonyms, thereby changing its identity to others in the network.

The automotive industry is set for a rapid transformation in the next few years in terms of communication. The kind of growth the automotive industry is poised for in fields of connected cars is both fascinating and alarming at the same time. The communication devices equipped to the cars and the data exchanges done between vehicles to vehicles are prone to a lot of cyber-related attacks. The signals that are sent using Vehicular Adhoc Network (VANET) between vehicles can be eavesdropped by the attackers and it may be used for various attacks such as the man in the middle attack, DOS attack, Sybil attack, etc. These attacks can be prevented using the Blockchain technology, where each transaction is logged in a decentralized immutable Blockchain ledger. This provides authenticity and integrity to the signals. But the use of Blockchain Platforms such as Ethereum has various drawbacks like scalability which makes it infeasible for connected car system.

This paper is the second in the series of documents designed to record the progress of a series of SAE documents - SAE J2836™, J2847, J2931, & J2953 - within the Plug-In Electric Vehicle (PEV) Communication Task Force. This follows the initial paper number 2010-01-0837, and continues with the test and modeling of the various PLC types for utility programs described in J2836/1™ & J2847/1. This also extends the communication to an off-board charger, described in J2836/2™ & J2847/2 and includes reverse energy flow described in J2836/3™ and J2847/3. The initial versions of J2836/1™ and J2847/1 were published early 2010. J2847/1 has now been re-opened to include updates from comments from the National Institute of Standards Technology (NIST) Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP), Smart Grid Architectural Committee (SGAC) and Cyber Security Working Group committee (SCWG).

Abstract The automotive industry intends to create new services that involve sharing vehicle control information via a wide area network. In modern vehicles, an in-vehicle network shares information between more than 70 electronic control units (ECUs) inside a vehicle while it is driven. However, such a complicated system configuration can result in security vulnerabilities. The possibility of cyber-attacks on vehicles via external services has been demonstrated in many research projects. As advances in vehicle systems (e.g., autonomous drive) progress, the number of vulnerabilities to be exploited by cyber-attacks will also increase. Therefore, future vehicles need security measures to detect unknown cyber-attacks. We propose anomaly-based intrusion detection to detect unknown cyber-attacks for the Control Area Network (CAN) protocol, which is popular as a communication protocol for in-vehicle networks.

Abstract Letter from the Co-editors